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G8's Dotforce Initiative: Bridging the
Digital Divide or Widening It?
Nate Brennaman*
[Information and communication technologies can] help to ignite a vir-
tuous circle of sustainable development. But misapplied, they can re-
sult in marginalisation of the poor and the unconnected.'
INTRODUCTION
The increasingly bleak outlook for the majority of people in
developing countries has led many to question the process of
globalization, 2 which promised a decade ago to bring wealth and
prosperity to all.3 Instead, it has brought unbounded prosperity
for some and continuing, or even increased, poverty for most.4
Sixty-six countries are worse off than they were a decade ago.5
The rich are richer than ever before, while 2.8 billion people live
on just a few dollars a day.
6
Access to information has become a determinative factor of
whether an individual is a 'have' or a 'have not' in today's tech-
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. G8, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY TASK FORCE, DIGITAL
OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL: MEETING THE CHALLENGE, 4, May 11, 2001 available at
http://www.dotforce.org [hereinafter THE DOTFORCE REPORT].
2. See GLOBALIZATION, GROWTH AND MARGINALIZATION 2-8 (A.S. Bhalla ed.,
1998).
3. See Speakers Address 'Digital Divide' Inequities in Globalization, as Dia-
logue on International Economic Cooperation Continues, M2 PRESSWIRE, Sept. 21,
2001 ("Globalization had promised unprecedented wealth and prosperity, but that
promise has not been realized.").
4. See id. ("[Globalization] ha[s] resulted in a world with prosperity in a
smaller part and poverty in the larger part.").
5. Id.
6. Id.
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nological world. 7 Those with access to information and commu-
nication technologies (ICT) are prospering, while those without
access to ICT are struggling.8 The social and economic disparity
between those with access to ICT and those without access is
commonly referred to as the "digital divide."9 There is little
doubt that the digital divide is growing, and will continue to
grow if steps are not taken to help developing countries catch-
up. 10
G8, an informal group of the world's strongest economic na-
tions, recently joined the effort to close the digital divide by cre-
ating the Digital Opportunity Task Force (Dotforce), an initia-
tive to introduce ICT into developing countries.11 The goal of
Dotforce is to "create digital opportunities for all."12 Some be-
lieve, however, that instead of empowering and enriching the
underserved of the developing world, Dotforce may actually ex-
acerbate the inequality between the rich and the poor.13
This Note will discuss the problems of Dotforce, the prob-
able effects of the initiative on developing countries, and what
more is needed to close the digital divide. Part I of the Note ex-
plains the digital divide, outlines the development of the Dot-
force initiative, and discusses some of the different viewpoints
on the introduction of ICT into developing countries. Part II of
the Note explains why the Dotforce program is likely to widen
the digital divide and discusses the probable motivations behind
7. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-8; see also K M. Nurul
Huda, The Digital Divide Vis-d-vis Developing Countries, THE INDEP. (London), June
14, 2001, WL5978071 (defining the digital divide as "the gross disparity between the
rich information haves and the information have nots"); Wallys W. Conhaim, The
Global Digital Divide, INFO. TODAY, July 1, 2001, at 1 (noting that most of the 'have'
countries are in the northern hemisphere, while most of the 'have not' countries are
in the southern hemisphere); Ernest J. Wilson III, Closing the Digital Divide: An
Initial Review, Internet Policy Institute, available at httpJ/www.internetpolicy.org
briefing/ErnestWilson0700.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2002) (referring to the digital
divide as the "have-have-not-gap").
8. See Doug Alexander, The IT Gap?, AFRICAN BUS., June 1, 2001, 2001 WL
11994415 ("The division is basically between the rich and poor. Those with access to
the Internet tend to be better-off, better-educated, and urban."); Roisin Wolnough,
Bridging the Digital Divide, COMPUTER WKLY., Sept. 13, 2001, 2001 WL 28561145
("While there is no doubt that IT has been a boon to many... it has also widened
the gap between the rich and the poor.").
9. See, e.g., J.M. Spectar, Bridging the Global Digital Divide: Frameworks for
Access and the World Wireless Web, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 57, 59 (2000).
10. See Conhaim, supra note 7, at 1.
11. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; see also G8 Steps Up Digital
Aid Plans, NEWSWIRE, July 30, 2001, 2001 WL 7309689 [hereinafter G8 Steps Up].
12. THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 53, 161-168.
[Vol.ll:311
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the Dotforce initiative. Part II also suggests solutions to the
problems of the Dotforce initiative and the digital divide gener-
ally. This Note concludes that, unless changes are made to the
program, Dotforce will widen the digital divide between the rich
and the poor within each country.
I. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND DOTFORCE
A. DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
The digital divide has been defined as, "the differentiation
or separation between those with access to the essential tools of
the information society and those without such access." 14 Lack
of access, the key cause of the digital divide, is a broad concept.
People in developing countries not only lack physical access to
computers and ICT, but also financial access, production access,
cognitive access, and political access.15 Described in more pre-
cise terms, the access related problems include: "inadequate in-
frastructure, high connectivity costs, a lack of locally relevant
content, language barriers, a dearth of venture capital and
workers' incapability to derive economic and social benefit from
information-intensive activities."
16
The fact that a digital divide exists on the world scale is not
seriously disputed. Citizens in developed countries comprise
90% of Internet users, although they represent only 16% of the
world population. 17 In fact, 98% of Latin Americans, 99.5% of
Africans, and 98% of Asians are not connected to the Internet.18
The United States and Canada alone account for 57% of world
Internet use, whereas Africa and the Middle East together ac-
count for only 1% of global Internet use.' 9 There is more Inter-
net use in New York City than in all of Africa.20 The digital di-
vide reflects a disparity not only in Internet use, but also in the
14. Spectar, supra note 9, at 59. The digital divide has also been defined as, "a
substantial asymmetry between two or more populations in the distribution and ef-
fective use of information and communication resources." Wilson, supra note 7.
15. Wilson, supra note 7 (describing in more detail these five access problems).
16. Rowan Callick, Asia's Digital Divide, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 17, 2001,
2001 WL 7309689 (citing a Deutsche Bank study on information economy in Asia);
see also THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
17. G8 Steps Up, supra note 11.
18. Wilson, supra note 7.
19. Alexander, supra note 8.
20. G8 Steps Up, supra note 11.
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use of other, older technologies. Television, telephones and even
electrical power are absent in parts of the developing world. 21
For example, half of the world's population has never used a
telephone. 2
2
Moreover, the divide is widening. Internet access is grow-
ing at a more rapid rate in developed countries than in develop-
ing countries. 23 Also, there are indications that the rate of
growth in Internet usage in developing countries is actually
slowing down. 24 For instance, now that the African economic
upper class is using the Internet, "penetration of the Internet is
reaching saturation levels" in Africa.25 Some assert that the
digital divide is not just widening, but is "growing exponen-
tially."
26
B. THE DOTFORCE INITIATIVE
G8, an informal intergovernmental organization27 whose
eight members have the strongest economies in the world, 28 ad-
dressed the digital divide problem when they met in Okinawa,
21. Alexander, supra note 8.
22. See Callick, supra note 16.
23. Conhaim, supra note 7 at 1.
24. See Paul Cullen, Computimes: 'Not a Significant Market'--Will the Poor
Always be With Us, Even in the Digital Age?, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 WL
30757976 (describing the slowdown of the rate of Internet use in Africa).
25. Id.
26. Spectar, supra note 9, at 63 (quoting World Bank President James D. Wolf-
ensohn).
27. See G8, How the G8 Works, at http://www.g8.gc.ca/abouthow-e.asp ("G8 is
an informal group of eight countries."); see also Birmingham Summit, G8 Structure:
An Informal Club, at http://birmingham.g8summit.gov.uk/brief0398/what.is.
g8.shtml (last visited Apr.3, 2002) ("G8 is an informal organisation, with no rules or
permanent Secretariat staff.").
As an 'informal club,' G8 does not have a legal international personality
recognized by international law. Cf. E. LUARD, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES: THE
EMERGING FRAMEWORK OF INTERDEPENDENCE 1-3, reprinted as excerpt in
FREDERICK L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING
522 (3d ed. 1993). G8, does not have power to dictate directives to member or non-
member countries, but must try to induce countries to act by offering incentives. See
id. at 522 ("International bodies do not possess the ultimate sanction of authority,
the power to impose decisions, which in the final resort, national governments can
exert. Instead, decisions are reached, programmes initiated.., mainly through the
voluntary acceptance of sovereign national states.").
Organizations of an international scope have drawn an increasing amount
of protest in recent years. See, e.g., Eric J. Lyman, Violence Erupts at G8 Parley,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 21, 2001, LEXIS Library File. G8 may have an especially
bad public image after the violent protests in Genoa, Italy in July of 2001. See id.
28. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8 (listing the G8 countries: Britain, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States).
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Japan in July 2000.29 At that meeting, the organization adopted
an 'IT charter' in which G8 members agreed to establish 'The
Digital Opportunity Task Force' (Dotforce) to solve the digital
divide problem. 30 In the course of three formal meetings in 2000
and 2001, Dotforce produced a report entitled "The Genoa Plan
of Action," detailing the digital divide and outlining a plan of ac-
tion for creating digital opportunities for all. 31 More recently,
29. See Digital Opportunity Task Force, Okinawa Charter on Global Informa-
tion Society, July, 2000, available at http://www.dotforce.org (last visited Feb. 25,
2002).
30. THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. Dotforce consists of forty-three
government, non-government, business, and non-profit representatives: seventeen
governmental representatives (Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, European Commis-
sion, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Russia, Senegal, South Af-
rica, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and the United States); seven representatives
from International/Multilateral Organizations (ECOSOC, ITU, OCED, UNDP,
UNCTAD, UNESCO, and World Bank); eleven representatives from the private sec-
tor (one representative for each G8 country plus three global networks, the Global
Information Infrastructure Commission (GIIC), the Global Business Dialogue on E-
Commerce (GBDE), and the World Economic Forum (WEF)); and eight representa-
tives from the non-profit sector (one representative from each G8 country). Id. at 21.
Dotforce was created in the fourth quarter of 2000. Id.
The 'Digital Opportunity Initiative" (DOI) was also created at the 2000
Okinawa summit. See DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY INITIATIVE, FROM DIGITAL DIVIDE TO
DIGITAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPMENT, at http://www.opt-init.org (last visited
Apr. 3, 2002). DOI is a public private partnership between Accenture, The Markel
Foundation, and the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP). Id. Whereas
Dotforce is designed to coordinate the efforts of governments, the private sector,
foundations and international institutions, The Digital Opportunity Initiative is de-
signed to mobilize action "on the ground" from the international community. See
DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY INITIATIVE, CREATING A DEVELOPMENT DYNAMIC; FINAL
REPORT OF THE DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY INITIATIVE July 2001, at 32-33, available at
http://www.opt-init.org/framework/DOI-Final-Report.pdf [hereinafter FINAL
INITIATIVE REPORT]. There is no indication, however, that the two groups are acting
in tandem. See id. Indeed, neither of the reports details the relationship between
the two organizations, except to make very brief mention of the other. Id. at 7-8; see
also THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. Importantly, DOI does not provide
the concrete guidelines that are absent from the Dotforce report, but is similarly un-
specific about the details of how ICT will flow into developing countries. FINAL
INITIATIVE REPORT at 7.
31. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-20. The formal meetings
occurred in Tokyo, November 27-28, 2000, in Cape Town, March 1-2, 2001, and in
Siena, Italy, April 23-24, 2001. Id. at 23. Dotforce also met informally at the follow-
ing meetings: OECD Dubai Emerging Market Economy Forum on E-Commerce,
January 16-18, 2001; Berlin, DSE Policy Forum on "Digital Inclusion", January 24,
2001; Davos, World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, January 29, 2001; Cairo,
IDSC/Egyptian Cabinet Conference on E-Business and Development, February 12-
15, 2001; and Naples, Third Global Forum, March 14-17, 2001. Id. at 23.
This report bears similarities to other international efforts to solve global
problems. For instance, in response to the shrinking ozone layer, a series of multi-
lateral treaties were produced between 1985 and 1997. See John K. Setear, Ozone,
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Dotforce produced a 'Framework for Implementation' 32 in an ef-
fort to push the plan forward.
The main premise of the Dotforce report is that ICT, once
the cause of the divide between rich and poor, can be strategi-
cally introduced into developing countries to provide sustainable
growth that will reach all people. 33 The Report sets out nine 'ac-
tion points' that constitute a plan of action for closing the digital
divide. 34 Along with the nine action points, there are four main
ideas in the Report. First, Dotforce and its affiliates plan to
work closely with each developing nation to establish govern-
mental policies and regulations that facilitate the introduction
of technology. 35 Second, Dotforce aims to improve connectivity,
increase ICT access, and lower the costs of ICT for people in de-
veloping countries. 36 Third, recognizing that ICT development
requires skilled workers, the report advocates building human
capacity.37 Fourth, Dotforce plans to encourage participation in
global e-Commerce by supporting entrepreneurship and local
Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 193, 209-16 (1999) (listing the
treaties). The first treaty, the Vienna Convention, simply stated that the subject
required further attention and included some specific procedural provisions to gov-
ern future protocols. See id. at 210. The purpose of this multi-step process is two-
fold. First, more countries are likely to participate in a treaty that only gradually
becomes demanding over time, rather than agreeing to a demanding treaty that is
'take it or leave it' at the outset. See id. at 214-216. Second, the convention-
protocol framework allows for the inclusion of new technology or scientific data as it
is discovered. See id. at 214. Despite the similarities however, THE DOTFORCE
REPORT is not a "framework," but is intended to be a final solution. See infra notes
185-190 and accompanying text.
32. See DOT Force (Genoa) Plan of Action: Framework for Implementation, Oc-
tober 10, 2001 available at http'//www.dotforce.org/reports/matrix.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Framework]. Although the aim of the Framework is to
.serve as the basis for carrying the work [of the Report] forward," DOT Force Im-
plementation Phase, The Way Forward, at http'/www.dotforce.org/reportsl
montreal-report.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2002), it mostly repeats what was said in
the report, and does not provide the concrete guidelines that appear to be missing
from the Report. See id, see also infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
Also recently produced by Dotforce is Dotforce, G8, Update on the Imple-
mentation of the Dotforce Genoa Plan of Action, December 21, 2001 available at
http://www.dotforce.org/reports/confcall_-Dec_01.pdf [hereinafter Dotforce Update].
The primary "updates" that are reported are that 'Implementation Teams" have
been organized to carry out each of the action points in the report, and that 8 devel-
oping countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa, and
Tanzania) are participating in the implementation work. Id.
33. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, 6-7.
34. See id. at 13-20.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5.
G8's DOTFORCE INITIATIVE
ICT development.38 The Report envisions that ICT will help
create sustainable development in developing countries and will
reduce poverty by stimulating economic growth.39 The Report
states the goal of "harnessing the power of [ICT] and global
networks to assure opportunity, empowerment, and inclusion
for all.
'40
The Report is not specific about how its goals will be
achieved or who will provide the funding.41 The Report simply
lists priorities and initiatives. These priorities and initiatives
are "unarguable," says one commentator, but they "will need
massive resources and it is not clear where these will come
from."42 It is also not clear who is responsible for putting the
plan in motion.43 Thus, while parts of the Report implicitly sug-
gest that enormous resources will be flowing from the developed
world to the developing world, other parts of the Report suggest
that the primary role of Dotforce will merely be to advise devel-
oping countries and to encourage awareness. 44
In either case, it appears that much of the burden will fall
on the governments of the developing countries, 45 who are to
generate "National e-Strategies" to provide frameworks for their
development goals.46 Unfortunately, governments of many de-
veloping countries are ineffective or corrupt.4v This has led
some to conclude that giving aid to these countries will not help
the people who need the aid most because it must be channeled
through these corrupt or ineffective governments. 48
38. Id.
39. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
40. Id. at 3.




43. See id. ("So we have a plan, but as yet no idea as to who will implement
[it] .")
44. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
45. See id. at 10 ("The main responsibility for relevant actions remains in the
hands of developing country governments.").
46. See id. at 13.
47. See, e.g., David Moberg, How to Fix the IMF; First, Do No Harm, IN THESE
TIMES, May 15, 2000, at 9, 10 (stating, in regard to their obligations to the IMF, that
many developing countries are "corrupt, ill-managed, inefficient, undemocratic, in-
equitable and ineffective in their basic tasks."); Muddassir Rizvi, Skepticism Greets
E-Government Plan, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 7, 2000, LEXIS, News Group File.
48. See Allen L. Hammond, Digitally Empowered Development, 80 NO. 2
FOREIGN AFF. 96, 103 (2001) (stating that "access to new technology... will not be
enough to ensure a more secure future, however; poor communities also need simple
justice. Such justice must include protection from the dangerous or unlawful actions
2002]
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Finally, the Report does not explain how Dotforce fits in
with other international efforts to bridge the digital divide.
49
The report stresses "partnership," and "cooperation," but is in-
consistent as to whether this applies to the worldwide efforts to
close the digital divide or just to Dotforce stakeholders. 50 In
short, the Report reiterates generally accepted principles, but
does not speak to when, where, or how those principles will be-
come reality.
51
of private interests or corrupt governments-especially in developing countries,
where regulations are often weak or unenforced."); see also Md. Tofazzel Hossain,
World Bank and Aid Flows to the Developing Countries, THE INDEP., Mar. 21, 2001,
2001 WL 5976232 (suggesting that aid actually "bolsters dictatorial and corrupt
governments.. ."); From the Slovak Press, CTK NATL NEWS WIRE, Sept. 26, 2000,
LEXIS, News Group File ("money allotted by the World Bank to the economic re-
vival in developing countries has often ended up in the pockets of a few members of
the ruling elite . . . ."); Jeffrey Sachs, Sachs on Globalisation: A New Map of the
World: Today's World is Divided not by Ideology, but by Technology, THE
ECONOMIST, June 24, 2000, at 81, 82 (describing three main channels by which
technologies can flow into a country, all of which depend on government action or
control).
49. Other international efforts to close the digital divide include: the United
Nation's Information and Communications Technology Task Force, The Digital Op-
portunity Initiative (a public private partnership of Accenture, the Markel Founda-
tion, the United Nation Development Programme); the 'Wire the World' program (a
program being organized by the World Intellectual Property Organization in Ge-
neva, as well as numerous efforts from the private sector and from countries acting
independently). See Eric R. Biel, The Impact of Technological Change on Developing
Countries, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 257, 263 (1999) (giving a sampling of what the U.S. is
doing to help developing countries); Dan Biers, Connecting the Masses: Hewlett-
Packard has a Grand Plan to Bring Silicon Valley to the Developing World; Nice
Idea, But Will it Pay?, FAR E. ECON REV., Mar. 29, 2001, 2001 WL-FEER 6645956;
Cullen, supra note 24 (explaining efforts by Oreland, the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, and Grameen Phone, a private mobile phone business); Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, Remarks at the Launching of the Information and Communica-
tions Technology Task Force, printed in Launching Information and Communica-
tions Technology Task Force, Secretary-General Appeals for Support from Private
Sector, M2 PRESSWrRE, Nov. 21, 2001, 2001 WL 30049599 [hereinafter Launching
ICTI.
50. See generally THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-20 (calling for co-
hesive action but not explaining how initiatives can or will cohere).
Whatever was intended, the reality is that the efforts to bridge the digital
divide remain separate. For instance, in announcing the launching of the United
Nations' "Information and Communications Technology Task Force," on November
20, 2001, Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that this UN initiative was designed
"to avoid duplicating the many initiatives that are already under way, such as the
Digital Opportunity Task Force." Launching ICT, supra note 49.
51. Southwood, supra note 41 ("The generally unarguable proposition has not
been translated into the more difficult practical approach.").
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C. CONFLICTING VIEWPOINTS ABOUT DOTFORCE AND THE
DIGITAL DIVIDE
The role of ICT in the development of third world countries
is a highly debated question, with a variety of conflicting view-
points about the likelihood of success of the Dotforce program.
The spectrum of viewpoints ranges from a belief that the intro-
duction of technology in developing countries will necessarily
produce favorable results,52 to a belief that ICT will inevitably
have a negative and regressive effect on developing countries.
53
An intermediate perspective is that ICT can have either a posi-
tive or negative effect, and that the effect of it is highly contin-
gent on the interaction between how ICT is introduced and the
actual conditions within the country.5 4 Dotforce embraces this
last view, recognizing that ICT can widen the digital divide if
not strategically implemented.
55
Despite Dotforce's sensitivity to the possibility of failure
and its efforts to ensure success, many critics argue that Dot-
force is a flawed program that will produce negative results.
First, they argue that impoverished people in developing coun-
tries need basic services-not ICT.56 For instance, one protest
group argued that "you could vaccinate 2000 children against
six killer diseases for the price of a computer."5 7 While most
critics recognize that the digital divide is an important issue,
they feel that resources should not be drawn away from provid-
ing basic needs to support the program.58 Supporters of Dot-
force argue, however, that it is not a matter of deciding between
basic needs and technology. 59 Developing countries will never
52. See Wilson, supra note 7.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
56. See G8 Steps Up, supra note 11; see also Alexander, supra note 8 (quoting
Seth Amgott, a spokesman for Oxfam America: "If you live in a village that is not on
an electrical grid, or phone system, which doesn't have access to safe drinking water
or a school, the want of a computer or Internet access aren't your primary prob-
lems."); Jim Krane, To Have and Have Not Summit Tackling Problem of a Global
Digital Divide, THE REC., July 16, 2001, at L5 (stating that Microsoft Chairman Bill
Gates said that the poor would be better served by electricity, healthcare, and clean
water than ICT).
57. IT Industry Urged to Fix Digital Divide, NEWSWIRE, July 27, 2000, 2000
WL 7655252 (identifying the protest group as Jubilee 2000).
58. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8.
59. Bridging the Digital Divide Linked to Broad Development, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Jan. 18, 2001, 2001 WL 2324049 (quoting Vincenzo Schioppa, head of Dot-
force, "It is not ICT or food. It is ICT for food, for health, for teaching and for social
2002]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE [Vol.11:311
be able to feed their hungry if they continue to fall behind tech-
nologically, but must embrace ICT to benefit from increased
productivity and new trade markets.
60
Second, critics of the plan point out that the infrastructures
of developing countries cannot support a sudden influx of ICT.
61
For instance, although the developing world makes up three-
quarters of the world's population, it only has 12% of the world's
telephone lines.62 Likewise, nearly 80% of the world's popula-
tion does not have a telephone.63 Proponents of the plan reply
that this is exactly the point. The Dotforce program will work
with developing countries to institute creative solutions to infra-
structure problems.64 For instance, new innovations in wireless
technology may make the lack of telephone wire infrastructure
irrelevant.6
5
Third, social problems like language barriers, illiteracy, and
lack of skilled workers are impossible obstacles for the program
to overcome.66 One critic could think of twelve reasons why
there are no skilled workers in developing countries, including
lack of proper training and flight of skilled workers to other
countries for higher pay.67 Dotforce repeats that one of its pri-
and human development."); see also G8 Steps Up, supra note 11; Krane, supra note
56.
60. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13, 16; see also Krane, supra
note 56.
61. See, e.g., Spectar, supra note 9, at 61-62.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that Dotforce will
"tak[e] advantage of new and emerging technologies").
65. See Krane, supra note 56.
66. See id. ("Much of humanity cannot read or write."); see Nurul Huda, supra
note 7.
67. The twelve reasons are:
(a) Lack of trained manpower both in private or public sectors,
(b) Most of the trained persons are not adequately aware of In-
formation Technology or use of website, local area network,
world area network, online, e-mail, etc., (c) Salary structure in
public offices for IT professionals is poor, (d) Computer experts
that the nation produces from various universities or institutions
opt to go abroad in search of better employment, (e) Officials of
the public offices do not/ cannot spend time to learn IT or com-
puter system [s], (M Officers mostly depend on personal staff for
using computers and then only for typing, (g) Senior officers and
policy makers do not always disseminate their knowledge and
expertise among the subordinate staff, leaving them ignorant of
the importance of the Information and Communication Technol-
ogy... (h) [The] language is yet to fit the computer system, (i)
Most people in the offices do not have command of English so
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mary initiatives is to train people to use the technology.68 The
hope is that increased training together with increased ICT in-
frastructure will result in skilled workers remaining in their
own countries.
Fourth, critics argue that Dotforce is a selfish program de-
signed primarily to open up new trade markets for G8 compa-
nies: "[t]o G8 governments, the technology gap is... a barrier to
global free trade. '69 Technology corporations in G8 countries are
eager to be a part of the program because they stand to profit
enormously from the ICT growth Dotforce envisions.70 It would
not be the first time major trading nations "introduc[ed] elec-
tronic-commerce into global trading arrangements to enhance
their own wealth, power, and market access at the expense of
others."71 The ICT revolution, it is argued, benefits the wealthy
countries by "revitalising the so-called 'old economy' while at the
same [time], expanding into new product areas and markets."
7 2
Some contend, however, that increased trade is mutually benefi-
cial, and that G8 should not be criticized for creating a win-win
solution to the problem.
7 3
Finally, the problem of the chicken and the egg relates to all
of the arguments above. What needs to come first, development
they cannot access the modern information network, (j) Scope of
ICT Application within the country is yet to expand, (k) Low
level of information-based knowledge is denying the benefits of
plenty of information generated every moment in the world, and
(1) Very limited opportunity of jobs are available at home for tal-
ented people in computer science.
Nurul Huda, supra note 7.
68. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16 (identifying action point
3 as: "Enhance Human Capacity Development, Knowledge, Creation and Sharing").
69. Alexander, supra note 8.
70. See id. (quoting Adrian Lovett of Jubilee 2000 successor Drop the Debt, say-
ing that technology firms just "want to get their hardware out there"); see also Spec-
tar, supra note 9, at 87 ("The new wireless order will be a bonanza for global busi-
ness."); Shawn McCarthy, G8 to Focus on 'Digital Divide' Between Rich and Poor,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 19, 2001, at A12 (suggesting that Canada's enthusiasm
for the Dotforce project can be explained by the fact that the Canadian "government
is pushing the digital divide as a way to sell Canadian technology and expertise").
71. Wiwit Wirsatyo, E-Commerce at Global Negotiation, JAKARTA POST, Mar.
31, 1999, 1999 WL 5634036 (internal parentheses omitted).
72. Hamisah Hamid, ICT Risks Widening of Digital Divide, Bus. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2001, 2001 WL 3844719.
73. See Spectar, supra note 9, at 88 ("The 'emerging networked world,' augurs
well for economic globalization as it dissolves barriers to market access and oppor-
tunity . . . ."); see also Biers, supra note 49 (stating, in reference to Hewlett-
Packard's program targeting the developing world, "At stake is not just a boost to
the company's bottom line but to economic development in the developing world as
well.").
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or technology? 74 Many critics of the initiative hold that a devel-
oping country needs a basic level of literacy and wealth for tech-
nology to take hold.7 The more popular view, and the one em-
braced by Dotforce proponents, is that introducing technology
into a developing country will itself lead to increased wealth and
literacy.76 The Dotforce report is based on the assumption that
if technology is made available, people will use it to further their
social and economic prosperity and the development of their
communities. 7
7
One area where there appears to be more agreement is the
development of ICT in developing countries to improve health
care. According to the Report of the Digital Opportunity Initia-
tive, "some of the most promising and clearly demonstrated ap-
plications for ICT in development are in the improvement of
health care delivery."78
D. ICT FAILURES IN THE PAST
Any effort to close the digital divide will be difficult and will
face many obstacles. While there seems to be agreement on this
point, there is a wide range of opinion on exactly how difficult
the effort will be and how big the obstacles are. The following
case study demonstrates the difficulties Dotforce may face when
introducing ICT into communities that are not accustomed to
computers and the Internet.
In Forst, Germany, population 25,000, the local government
spent one million Euros to build a call center for area retailers
and financial companies. 79 The project was meant to eliminate
the 19% unemployment rate in Forst.80 The call center was the
centerpiece of a three-year plan to move Forst from an old in-
dustrial economy into the new digital economy."1
74. Cullen, supra note 24.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
78. FINAL INITIATIVE REPORT, supra note 30, at 10-11 (listing the health care
benefits of ICT as: 1. remote consultation, diagnosis and treatment; 2. facilitation of
collaboration among physicians for both treatment and research; 3. facilitation of
disease prevention and epidemic response efforts; 4. dissemination of public health
messages; and 5. more efficient public health systems and facility administration).
79. See Christopher Rhoads, All Dressed Up, Nowhere to Go: Forlorn Textile






The plan did not work.82 While one third of the 11,000
households had high-speed cable modems installed, only thirty
of these households opted to buy the service that would connect
them to the Internet.8 3 The 'online marketplace' for Forst com-
panies is merely a list of company addresses because the com-
panies are afraid to reveal prices to one another.8 4 One of the
remaining textile firms in town has generated only nine new
customers in fifteen months from its website.8 5 No new jobs
were developed because the local workforce was inadequately
qualified for the jobs available.
8 6
The experience of Forst has been replicated elsewhere. For
instance, Internet use is not growing quickly in Russia due to
heavy-handed governmental control on the movement of infor-
mation.87 In the United Kingdom, there is also a growing digital
divide.88 Chris Yapp, from the Imperial College London, notes
that the United Kingdom "need[s] to avoid exacerbating the di-
vide." 89
While the United States is the leader in Internet use, it also
has problems with the digital divide.90 At a House Committee
hearing on this subject, one speaker explained that the same
problems that face developing countries face rural America: lack
of physical access, lack of skilled workers, lack of educational
opportunities in ICT, and a lack of governmental help.91
In contrast to what happened in Forst, the proponents of
Dotforce are quick to point out that there have also been docu-
mented cases of success in introducing technology to developing
countries. For instance, India has succeeded in integrating its
workforce into the "new economy" using ICT.92 Its software ex-
82. Id. ("The mayor conceded that the eighty jobs he promised with the comple-
tion of... [the] call center wouldn't materialize after all.").
83. See id.
84. See Rhoads, supra note 79.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. John McLaughlin, Planet Web: Putting Russia's Democracy to the Test, THE
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Dec. 4, 2000, at http'//www.thestandard.com/
article/0,1902,20573,00.html.
88. IT Industry Urged To Fix Digital Divide, supra note 57 ("Forty-eight per-
cent of the most affluent UK households have access to the internet, compared with
fewer than six percent of the poorest.").
89. Id.
90. Rural Access to Technology: Connecting the Last American Frontier: Hear-
ing before the Subcomm. on Tech. of the House Comm. on Science, 106th Cong. 104-
106 (2000).
91. See id.
92. See Wolnough, supra note 8.
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ports topped $4 billion, and the service economy accounted for
as much as 60% of the total economy in some of the large cit-
ies.93 One commentator explains that the reason for success of
ICT in India is the investment friendly laws of its cities and an
"eagerness displayed by all to learn computer skills."94 Others
note that the reason for India's success is the large number of
English speakers and India's world-class educational institu-
tions. 95 The impetus for India's improvement, however, was
from the government and the people of India themselves-not
outside groups.
96
In summary, while everyone agrees that something must be
done to help the poor in developing countries, there is no con-
sensus on whether ICT generally, and Dotforce in particular, is
the answer. The trouble is that ICT is both the cause and the
cure of the digital divide problem, thus any proposed solution is
in danger of actually exacerbating the problem. In the next sec-
tion, this Note discusses why the Dotforce initiative is a solution
that will actually exacerbate the problem.
II. THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF DOTFORCE AND THE
MOTIVATIONS OF G8
Success stories seem to suggest that developing countries
can integrate themselves into the "high-tech" economy,97 while
other stories, such as Forst's, suggest that change on a nation-
wide scale is likely to be difficult or even impossible.98 As will be
shown below, Dotforce does not provide the tools for developing
countries to replicate these successes. In fact, the ambiguities of
the program and its lack of structure threaten to contribute to
the problem of the digital divide.
A. DOTFORCE WILL WIDEN THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
Dotforce is flawed because of the unspecific language of the
Report and problems in its implementation. The Report does
not provide clear directives for action to solve the digital di-
93. Id.
94. Hoosain Kagee, Interesting Questions on the Digital Divide, Bus. DAY, July
16, 2001, at 8.
95. FINAL INITIATIVE REPORT, supra note 30, at 63.
96. See id. at 62-63.
97. See Wolnough, supra note 8 ("India is a prime example of a country that
has capitalized on the benefits of an IT literate work force.").
98. See Rhoads, supra note 79; see also supra text accompanying note 70.
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vide.99 Likewise, it fails to provide incentives to encourage de-
veloping countries to participate in, and comply with, the Re-
port.100 The cumulative effect of these flaws will be to enrich the
government and industry elite of developing countries, but not
to help the poor and unconnected.
1. Dotforce Does Not Provide Clear Directives for Action
The primary problem with Dotforce is that it is merely ad-
visory in scope and has no real power to effect change. 01 The
Report does not oblige anyone to act to close the divide.10 2 In the
section of the Dotforce report entitled "Role for the G8 and other
development stakeholders," the responsibilities are defined as:
"offering a fresh vision... proposing innovative tools and proc-
esses... call[ing] on the support and continued commitment of
the leaders of G8 ... addressing the issue of the digital divide in
an open and imaginative fashion."10 3 Thus, Dotforce and its
stakeholders have only an advisory role, not an active role, in
closing the digital divide.
This point is further evidenced by the fact that, although it
is dubbed a "Plan of Action," the final report of Dotforce does not
establish any clear directives for action. 10 4 It does not describe
how the initiative will be funded. 10 5 It does not explain who is
responsible for initiating the "action points" in the Report.
106
The Report does not give a time when the intervention should
begin. 0 7 Finally, the Report does not describe specifically what
communities or nations will be helped.108 The Report is simply a
collection of general, positive sounding assertions, with no indi-
cation of how change will actually occur.109
The recently produced Framework for Implementation
99. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1 at 13-20; see also Southwood, su-
pra note 41.
100. See Southwood, supra note 41; see also THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note
1, at 13-20.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 41-51.
102. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-20.
103. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 13-20.
105. See Southwood, supra note 41.
106. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-20; see also Southwood, su-
pra note 41.
107. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-20.
108. See id.
109. See id; see also Southwood, supra note 41 ("The generally unarguable
proposition has not been translated into the more difficult practical approach.").
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(Framework) does not provide the missing details.110 Instead, it
mostly repeats the policy goals and 'initiatives' listed in the Re-
port."1 For example, one of the only differences between the
Report and the Framework under the first action point is that
the Framework lists as a "12-month deliverable" to "Finalize the
strategic plan for the International e-Development Resource
Network."112 This new twelve-month time frame represents a
change from the Report, which called for a final plan for that
network six months after the Genoa G8 summit, or January 22,
2002.113 Perhaps the plan is being delayed because the Dotforce
Report did not correctly identify who was responsible for produc-
ing the finalized network. 114 The framework for implementation
suffers from the same ambiguity as the Report, and it will not
motivate countries to act to solve the digital divide.
The Report does not make clear what benefits are being of-
fered to developing countries that choose to participate in the
program."' The G8 only promises help and advice, while em-
phasizing that "the main responsibility for relevant actions re-
mains in the hands of developing country governments .... ,,116
The Report also stresses that the main focus of the initiative is
to enable the underserved. 17 Cognizant of the enormity of this
task, developing countries may be unwilling to participate in the
initiative with only vague promises of help and advice from Dot-
force. Perhaps this is why only eight developing countries are
presently participating in the program.1
8
A final problem caused by the ambiguity of the Report is
that there is no structure in place to ensure that ICT will get
dispersed to underserved citizens of countries with ineffective or
corrupt governments. 19 Instead, Dotforce makes these govern-
ments completely responsible. The Report states that develop-
110. See Framework, supra note 32.
111. See generally THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1; Framework, supra note
32..
112. Framework, supra note 32; see also THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 13-14.
113. THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
114. See id.
115. See generally id.
116. See id. at 10.
117. See id. at 11 ("Special efforts should aim at enhancing the level of connec-
tivity among the poorest, women and children and less densely populated areas of
the planet.").
118. See Dotforce Update, supra note 32, at 1 (listing the developing countries:
Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania).
119. See generally THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1.
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ing countries' "governments will ... establish the environment
within which the new technologies can spread to their citi-
zens."120 As a result, any aid given to a country may remain in
the hands of the government and industry elite, who may not be
inclined to share.12' Put another way, The Dotforce Report over-
flows with talk of cooperation, 22 but cooperation is a two way
street. The Report does not indicate what will happen if a gov-
ernment fails to cooperate.'
23
2. Three Problems Regarding the Implementation of Dotforce
Dotforce faces grave challenges actualizing the goals laid
out in the Report. The Report is silent about what benefits will
be provided for developing countries that participate in the pro-
gram, who will pay for these benefits, and how and when they
will be provided. 124 The role of Dotforce is primarily advisory in
scope,125 while the bulk of responsibility is on the governments
of developing countries. 26 As a result of these characteristics of
Dotforce, there will be three big obstacles to implementing the
program successfully.
First, many governments of developing countries will lack
incentive or believe it impractical to, participate in the program.
Despite Dotforce's promises of support, developing countries
may not be eager to tackle such an enormous problem.' 27 Also,
in less stable countries, governments simply may not be capable
of implementing the program. 128 As a result, some, even most,
of the developing world may get left out of the effort to close the
digital divide.'
29
Second, even if these governments are willing and able to
120. Id. at 10.
121. See From the Slovak Press, supra note 48 ("Money allotted . . . to the eco-
nomic revival in developing countries has often ended up in the pockets of a few
members of the ruling elite.").
122. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 4, 10, 12, 13.
123. See id. at 10-20.
124. See Southwood, supra note 41; see also THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note
1, at 13-20.
125. See supra text and accompanying notes 41-51.
126. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 ("The main responsibility
for relevant actions remains in the hands of developing country governments, enter-
prises and non-governmental organizations, working in tandem.").
127. See, e.g., Krane, supra note 56; Moberg, supra note 47, at 10.
128. See Moberg, supra note 47, at 10.
129. For instance, only eight developing countries are currently participating in
the Dotforce program. See Dotforce Update, supra note 32, at 1.
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develop ICT in their countries, the benefits may not reach all of
their citizens. 130 As mentioned above, the governments of devel-
oping countries will control how, and the extent to which, ICT
will flow into their countries. 131 The problem with this, as one
critic suggests, is that "the elites in government and business
may not be predisposed to share the benefits of technology more
broadly and help empower the dispossessed parts of their popu-
lations. ' 132 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that an oppressive
government that already hoards the citizens' wealth will set up
a complex and hard-to-implement program to help empower its
citizens.
The Dotforce Report does not include any enforcement
mechanisms that address the possibility that a government will
not cooperate. 133 This puts Dotforce in a very uncomfortable po-
sition. Dotforce wants to help the industry and government as
well as the poor and rural populations of developing countries." 4
Dotforce believes that industry and developing countries' popu-
lations will grow together.' 35 What will Dotforce do, however, if
a government uses Dotforce aid to benefit the government and
industry elite, but not the underserved majority of citizens? On
the one hand, the digital divide will appear to shrink because
the developing country will begin to develop an ICT economy
and therefore catch up to developed countries. On the other
hand, the aid may not help the people who need it most.136 Dot-
force may be reluctant to withdraw assistance from these coun-
tries, hoping that the benefits of ICT will at least trickle down to
the poor, with the result that the program will continue to sup-
port corrupt and ineffective governments that have no intention
or ability to help their citizens. The other option would be to
withdraw aid altogether, which would not help anybody. Dot-
130. See Moberg, supra note 47, at 10.
131. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (stating 'the main respon-
sibility for relevant actions remains in the hands of developing country governments
. . ." and 'governments will have to establish the environment within which the new
technologies can spread to their citizens.. . ."); see also Sachs, supra note 48, at 81.
132. Biel, supra note 49, at 265.
133. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-20.
134. See id.
135. See Spectar, supra note 9, at 88 ("The 'emerging networked world' augers
well for economic globalization.").
136. See Moberg, supra note 47, at 10 (stating that governmental problems im-
pair the path of aid to the people who need it). But see Biel, supra note 49, at 261
(hoping that "more imaginative and farsighted leaders may see that embracing




force has no effective way of making countries comply with its
program. Thus, for ineffective or uncooperative governments,
Dotforce may not succeed in getting aid to the rural and poor.
Third, even if the governments of developing countries do
make a sincere effort to close the digital divide for all of their
citizens, there is little reason to believe that it will work, be-
cause Dotforce's limited scope,' 37 does not provide the structure
or muscle to close the digital divide. 138 In this regard, the ex-
ample of what happened in Forst is very discouraging.' 39 Ger-
many, the biggest economy in Europe, was spending billions of
Marks to bring Eastern Germany into the new, "high tech"
economy. 140 The town of Forst already had a good infrastruc-
ture, which was being bolstered by a project to install high-
speed cable modems in each household.' 4 ' Even in this commu-
nity, which is in a developed country and has the full financial
support of the government, technology did not catch on.' 42 No
new economic opportunities were created. 143
This example should lead Dotforce to question some of its
basic assumptions about ICT in developing countries. ICT did
not spur economic growth in a place as developed as Forst,
Germany.144 Those places where basic needs are not met will
have even greater difficulty bridging the divide. 145
Proponents of Dotforce, point to those countries where ICT
has been successfully introduced, and reason that these good
outcomes can be replicated everywhere. 146 For instance, India is
often cited as a developing country that has succeeded, due to its
explosion onto the software and telecommunications front in the
last decade. 4
7
India, however, is a unique case where conditions that are
not present in other developing countries contributed to the ICT
boom. 48 First, India succeeded in introducing ICT only because
of strong governmental intervention.' 49 The government made a
137. See, e.g., THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.





144. See supra text accompanying notes 56-68.
145. See Alexander, supra note 8; see also Krane, supra note 56.
146. See Wolnough, supra note 8.
147. See id.
148. See id.; see also Kagee, supra note 94.
149. See Kagee, supra note 94.
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conscious decision to rebuild their industrial economies into new
"digital economies." 150 Among other initiatives, The Indian gov-
ernment passed laws to make it profitable for foreign companies
to invest and build in its cities, including protective intellectual
property laws. 151 Other characteristics that made ICT a success
included a well-educated population eager to learn computer
skills and a large number of English speakers who could under-
stand the predominantly English-text Internet.152 Most develop-
ing countries do not have the same conditions that existed in
India.15 3 For example, in the places that have the greatest need
for the benefits of ICT, there is neither an eager, well-educated
population, English speakers, nor strong government support.
154
Dotforce does not appear to provide the structure and re-
sources to overcome these problems. 155 Again, this problem
stems from the Report's vagueness. 15 6 The Report refers in an
abstract fashion about aiding governments of developing coun-
tries to pass laws making it easier for ICT to thrive, 5 7 but is si-
lent as to who or how it will aid, or what incentives there are for
developing countries to cooperate. 58 Likewise, the report men-
tions building human capacity, but again, it does explain spe-
cifically who will do the educating, where the resources will
come from, or what these people will be trained to do. 5 9
A further problem not addressed in the Dotforce report is
that, for a population not already eager to use ICT, the hardest
task will be to make people understand why ICT is important to
them. This was a problem in Forst, 60 and, as one might imag-
ine, is bound to be an even bigger problem in less developed ar-
eas. Thus, while India provides a good model of how the digital
divide can be closed, the example highlights the deficiencies of
the Dotforce program, which does not provide the structure and
support to help countries not already willing and able to em-
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Kagee, supra note 94; see also FINAL INITIATIVE REPORT, supra note 30,
at 63.
153. See Kagee, supra note 94.
154. See id.
155. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-20.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 11 ("Fundamentally, awareness must be encouraged among de-
veloping countries to help their governments to undertake the reforms necessary to
ensure that pro-competitive policy and regulatory frameworks are in place .....
159. See id. at 15-16.




3. Dotforce Will Widen the Digital Divide
As discussed above, some developing countries will not try
to close their digital divides, others will participate in Dotforce
but not share the benefits with their poor citizens, and still oth-
ers will sincerely try to enable all their citizens with ICT but
will fail due to inadequate support and structure from Dotforce.
The cumulative effect of these implementation problems will be
to widen the digital divide within each developing country. To
the extent that the Dotforce program has any effect at all, it will
likely benefit the elite and technologically sophisticated within
each country, but not the rural and poor.
There are really two levels of the digital divide.'61 The first
is between developed and undeveloped countries.' 62 The second
is between the powerful and the powerless within a single coun-
try.' 63 Even if Dotforce narrows the gap between countries by
giving ICT resources to the government and industry elite of de-
veloping countries, there is little reason to hope that this second
type of digital divide will shrink.
Dotforce gives the resources and control of ICT to the gov-
ernment and industry of developing countries, causing the digi-
tal divide to grow between the sophisticated elite and the poor.
The Dotforce Report provides that governments will control "the
environment within which the new technologies can spread to
their citizens .... ,,164 The Report also encourages the develop-
ment of industry.165 By structuring the program so that ICT
runs through the government and industry of each country, Dot-
force will further advantage the educated elite that have the so-
phistication to use ICT to produce wealth. Even if governments
and their industries make an effort to enable their poor rural
populations, 166 these populations will not be able to keep up
with the high-tech elite of each country. The elite control the
spread of ICT and already have the resources and know-how to
use ICT to its fullest potential. This situation reflects the dual
nature of ICT.167 ICT is the solution to the digital divide, "but
161. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 7.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
165. See generally id.
166. See Moberg, supra note 47, at 10; see also text accompanying notes 47-48.
167. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also Wilson, supra note 7.
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misapplied, [it] can result in marginalisation of the poor and un-
connected." 168 Under the Dotforce program, the sophisticated
elite will control the ICT, leaving the poor far behind.
This grim prediction is supported by evidence that even
within the most developed countries, there remains a gap be-
tween the technologically sophisticated urban population and
the technologically unsophisticated rural population. 169 Russia,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, all G8
countries, are struggling to close the digital divide in their own
countries. 170 G8 countries propose to solve problems in develop-
ing countries that they cannot resolve in their own.
B. THE REAL PURPOSE OF DOTFORCE
The Dotforce Report has so few concrete guidelines and so
little incentive for developing countries to participate, that one
must wonder whether it was even intended to be an effective
agent for change. The drafters of the Dotforce Report must have
recognized that it would provide little real improvement without
concrete guidelines, attractive incentives to developing coun-
tries, and specifically delegated responsibilities to G8 stake-
holders. As it stands, however, few developing countries are in-
terested, and nobody is obliged to take action to solve the
problem. Is this really a solution, or does G8 have other mo-
tives? There are several possibilities.
First, many critics argue that the true purpose of Dotforce
is to open new trade for the benefit of G8 countries. 17' They ar-
gue that all the philanthropic talk is merely a pretense for ena-
bling G8's multinational corporations to get their tentacles into
developing countries to suck resources out. 72 This is not an ac-
curate portrayal of Dotforce.
While it is likely that bringing developing countries up to
speed technologically would produce new markets for G8 com-
panies,' 73 it would not be accurate to tag the initiative as moti-
vated completely, or even primarily, by greed. ICT creates eco-
nomic opportunities in the form of increased production and
trade. 74 This economic stimulus can be mutually beneficial to
168. THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
169. See e.g. IT Industry Urged to Fix Digital Divide, supra note 57.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Spectar, supra note 9, at 87; see also McCarthy, supra note 70.
172. See Spectar, supra note 9, at 87.
173. See Hamid, supra note 72.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
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both developing countries and the G8 countries. 175 Thus, while
the program is greedy in the sense. that it is not wholly philan-
thropic, it is probably not sinister or malicious. Everyone has
an interest in seeing the digital divide close.
Second, the Dotforce initiative may simply be an enormous
public relations campaign to help better its image. Interna-
tional groups do not have the best reputations after the violent
protests at Seattle, Washington and Genoa, Italy. 176 Many see
the efforts at globalization as merely the imposition of western
values on the world, or worse, the exploitation of the powerless
for the benefit of huge western multinational corporations.
177
G8, a group that consists of the richest countries, probably has a
worse public image than most. 178
In this context, it is not outrageous to suggest that G8 is us-
ing Dotforce as a publicity stunt to better G8's image. The lan-
guage of the Report seems to reflect this.179 First, the Report is
filled with philanthropic gushing that comes across as self-
congratulatory. 8 0 Second, as mentioned above, the Report as-
signs no obligations.18' G8 can therefore have its moment on
center stage, but then the issue can quietly disappear with no
one being held directly responsible for its failure.
A third theory, more sympathetic to Dotforce, is that the
program may simply be a beginning, or a framework for
change. 8 2 Change of this magnitude requires time and plan-
ning. Success is bound to be the product of a slow gradual proc-
ess, and this initial Report could be construed as just the first
step in getting the world to think about the issue. 8 3 Multi-step
solutions to international problems are not uncommon in inter-
national law.' s4
However, in regard to Dotforce, the framework theory is not
convincing for a number of reasons. First, Dotforce regards the
report discussed in this Note as a final report. If it were in-
tended to be a framework Report, other reports would follow. 85
175. See e.g. Spectar, supra note 9, at 88; see also Biers, supra note 49.
176. See Lyman, supra note 27.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See generally THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Setear, supra note 31, at 209-16 (discussing the solution to the shrink-
ing of the Ozone layer).
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See Setear, supra note 31, at 213 (describing multi-step treaties).
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Second, under the present circumstances, a framework report is
not needed-a plan of action is needed. The digital divide has
long been recognized as a problem, and there are already many
international groups acting, or ready to act, to help bridge the
divide.18 6 Third, the goal of a Framework report should be to
unify the efforts into a single cause.18 7 But the Dotforce Report
does not unify.l8 8 In fact, there remain numerous independent
efforts, in addition to the G8 effort, to close the digital divide.
189
A final theory regarding G8's motivation is that Dotforce
may be a sincere program to achieve all of the things it says in
the Report, but G8 may not be the type of organization best
suited to make it all possible. While each of the members of G8
is powerful by itself, the organization has no authority to tell
developing countries what to do.190 One possible reason the Re-
port does not have concrete guidelines is that G8 simply lacks
the authority to command action. Thus, the Report is simply a
reflection of the powerlessness of G8 to create and encourage
change, especially when that change may require strong-arming
governments to support the initiative.
Which of these scenarios seems the most likely? It is prob-
able that each of them played a role in shaping the Report of the
Dotforce initiative. There is no reason to suspect that the mem-
bers of G8 do not feel a real obligation to help those in need.
However, it is not unthinkable that G8 would like to polish its
international image and open new markets across the world.
One must remember that G8 and Dotforce are large organiza-
tions with delegates who represent, and are responsible for ad-
vocating, all kinds of different interests. There is probably not
just one single motivation behind the program, but a number of
different interests, some philanthropic and some selfish.
C. SOLUTIONS
Everyone agrees that something should be done to help the
impoverished people of developing countries. But is introducing
ICT into developing countries the answer? As discussed above,
this solution may actually exacerbate the problem by widening
186. See Biel, supra note 49, at 263; see also Biers, supra note 49.
187. See Setear, supra note 31, at 210 (discussing the solution to the shrinking
of the Ozone layer).
188. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-20.
189. See Biel, supra note 49, at 263; see also Biers, supra note 49; see also Cul-
len, supra note 24.
190. See KIRGIS JR., supra note 27, at 522.
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the disparity between the rich and the poor within each coun-
try.191 There are several improvements that could be made to
the Dotforce program that would help minimize this effect.
First, the language of the Report should specify what bene-
fits are available to developing countries, who is responsible for
putting those programs in action, when and how they would be
put into action, and who would pay for it. Only this kind of spe-
cific plan is likely to inspire developing countries to participate
and trigger action on the part of G8 stakeholders.
Second, if Dotforce is serious about closing the digital divide
for all developing countries, it should offer attractive incentives
for countries that participate and for governments that pass the
benefits on to all of their citizens. Presently, only eight develop-
ing countries have shown an interest in Dotforce. 192 G8 cannot
force developing countries to participate. 93 Furthermore, G8
cannot force governments to share the benefits of ICT.194 The
only means of controlling the actions of developing countries is
by offering or withholding incentives.1 95 Dotforce should create,
and state clearly in its Report, incentives for participation and
compliance with the program.
Third, Dotforce should not channel aid through the govern-
ments and industry of developing countries. 196 As discussed
above, the likely result of this will be to enrich the hi-tech elite
of developing countries, but not the poor.1 97 Instead, Dotforce
should, upon consent of the developing country, create its own
programs to work directly with poor and rural populations of
that country.
Fourth, closing the digital divide will occur most quickly by
focusing ICT on healthcare.1 98 Not only is healthcare where ICT
is needed most, but it is also where ICT has been shown to have
the greatest positive effect.1 99 The spread of ICT, for purposes
other than healthcare, will be more likely in areas where basic
health services are being provided. 200 Finally, if people see an
example of ICT being used in hospitals to improve people's lives,
191. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
192. See DOTFORCE UPDATE, supra note 32, at 1.
193. See LUARD, supra note 27, at 522.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Hammond, supra note 48, at 103; see also Moberg, supra note 47, at 10.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
198. See FINAL INITIATIVE REPORT, supra note 30, at 10-11.
199. See Bridging Digital Divide Linked to Broad Development, supra note 59.
200. See THE DOTFORCE REPORT, supra note 1.
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they may be eager to find ways ICT can improve their own lives.
Finally, there does not appear to be an easy solution to the
inherent difficulties that exist in connecting people to the Inter-
net who do not do not have basic services and do not understand
how ICT can improve their lives. Perhaps the best aspect of the
Dotforce program is its optimism that this problem can be
solved. However, for a better solution, that same optimism
should accompany a more carefully and specifically designed ef-
fort to close the digital divide.
CONCLUSION
The digital divide is a complex problem because the solution
to closing the divide can also be the cause of its growth between
the rich and poor. As a result, any initiative to solve the digital
divide must carefully avoid exacerbating the problem by further
empowering the rich and educated who have access to ICT. Dot-
force, unfortunately, will do just that. Due to ambiguities in the
Report and problems of implementation, the likely result of Dot-
force will be to enrich the developing countries' elite, and not
help the poor. Some critics have speculated that G8 has selfish
motivations. Although Dotforce is not wholly philanthropic, it is
not completely self-serving. G8 is interested in both polishing
its international image and opening new trade markets for its
corporations, but there is no reason to suspect that G8 is not
also sincere in its desire to close the digital divide and help the
world's poor. A more specific, concrete plan is needed to accom-
plish that goal, as well as incentives for third world govern-
ments who are reluctant to either participate in the program or
to pass along the benefits of ICT to all of their citizens.
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